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A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine
MORE COHERENT, LESS SUBJECTIVE, AND
OPERATIONAL
Amitai Etzioni†
In a previous paper, I outlined a privacy doctrine—a cyber
age privacy doctrine, or a CAPD—that seeks to account for
important differences between the paper age and the digital one.1
In the paper age, the main issue was whether or not the
government should be allowed to collect personal information
without first gaining a court’s approval. Many court cases sought
to determine whether a particular collection of information by the
government—using a wiretap, or a dog, or a speed camera—
searching one’s trash, or mail—was constitutional. In the cyber
age, secondary usages of legally-collected information have become
so common that a very major concern has become the
circumstances under which such usages should be banned to
preserve privacy. So much legally-collected personal information
is available in the hands (or in the cloud) of third parties that their
secondary usages determine to a large extent how much privacy we
still have. For example, although corporations legally collect
information about their customers, may they sell it to others? To
the government? The CAPD suggests the criteria that should serve
as a foundation for a doctrine governing such secondary usages.
This article attempts to show that the CAPD provides a
coherent normative doctrine that can be employed by the courts
and legislatures and that is more systematic, less subjective, and
at least as operational as the prevailing privacy doctrines. It deals
with the right to privacy vis-à-vis the United States government
rather than as a protection from intrusions by private actors such
as corporations. Part I of this article summarizes and develops the
previously-published doctrine. Part II compares the coherence
† I am indebted to Peter Swire, Joris van Hoboken, and Daniel Pesciotta for
profound comments on a previous draft, to Erin Syring for research assistance, and to
Thomas Rory Donnelly for editorial comments on a previous draft.
1 Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: A Liberal Communitarian
Approach, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 641 (2014).
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and objectivity of the CAPD to those of other doctrines and
indicates the ways the CAPD can be operationalized.
I. THE CYBER AGE PRIVACYDOCTRINE REVISITED
The advent of the cyber age—also referred to as the digital
revolution—requires a new privacy doctrine. The main, although
not only, reason for this requirement is that the proportion of
privacy violations that result from secondary usages of personal
information compared to those that result from primary collection
has radically changed. Most privacy violations in the paper age
resulted from primary collection; most violations in the cyber age
result from secondary usages of information that has been legally
collected. If a collection was deemed legal in the paper age, there
were still very sharp limits, at least in practice, on the additional
uses to which this information could be put.2 Thus, the danger
that it would be abused was relatively limited. In the cyber age,
information can be collated much more readily with other items of
information, analyzed, and distributed; these processes together
comprise “cybernation.”3
The difference in the extent of secondary usages between
the paper age and the cyber age is of such a magnitude that one
is hard put to find a measurement or analogy to express it. The
difference is much greater than the difference between the impact
of a hand grenade and that of a nuclear bomb. Indeed, most
secondary analyses conducted these days by using a laptop within
a very short period of time—not to mention what is carried out in
the “cloud”—could not be carried out at all in the paper age.
Because this point is crucial to all that follows, and because people
have become so accustomed to the cyber age’s information facilities,
a simple example follows to illustrate the transformation’s scope.
Interpol’s database of lost and stolen travel documents includes
more than 39 million entries reported by 166 countries.4 When
travelers pass through airport security, authorities can determine
in a split second whether the passports they carry are on the
Interpol list.5 Such an operation would have been unimaginable a
2 For example, in the paper age, arrest records were kept by local police
departments; if an individual wanted to see if a given person had ever been arrested,
they would have to review many different police departments’ files. See id. at 668.
3 Id. at 642-43.
4 Elisha Fieldstadt & Becky Bratu, Missing Passport Databases Not Routinely
Checked: Interpol, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/missing-jet/missing-passport-databases-not-routinely-checked-interpol-n48261.
5 Josephine Wolff, Papers, Please: How to Make Every Country Check
Passports to Make Sure They Aren’t Stolen, SLATE (Mar. 11, 2014, 4:42 PM),
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mere two decades ago. Among others who have pointed to the
rising problem posed by secondary usages of personal
information—and have suggested the direction in which
governments and the private sector may next move—are Peter
Cullen, Fred Cate, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, and Craig Mundie.6
However, most relevant court cases in the United States
deal mainly with the primary collection of personal information,
much of which falls into the category of “spot collection.”7 These
cases concern whether the collection of information through drug
testing, wiretaps, screening gates at airports, DNA sampling,
breathalyzers, and so forth constitutes a search in Fourth
Amendment terms; that is, they concern whether collection should
be freely allowed or should require authorization by a distinct
institution following given procedures. Notable cases include,
among others, Katz v. United States,8 Terry v. Ohio,9 United
States v. White,10 United States v. Knotts,11 United States v.
Karo,12 Kyllo v. United States,13 United States v. Jones,14 and
Florida v. Jardines.15 The courts, in these and other such cases,
pay little mind to the privacy violations that occur when
personal information that is legally collected is later stored,
combined with other information, and analyzed. They,
consequently, do not address the fact that information that has
been legally collected may be used later to harm the privacy of the
individuals involved, harm of such an order that the courts would
have prevented it, had it been caused by collection. A privacy
doctrine suitable for the cyber age must address both primary
collection and subsequent secondary usages of information. Details
follow, but as a general principle the government can allow some
kinds of personal information to be freely collected and used
www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/03/mh_370_stolen_passports_why
_don_t_most_countries_check_interpol_s_sltd_database.html.
6 Craig Mundie, Privacy Pragmatism: Focus on Data Use, Not Data Collection,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140741/craig-
mundie/privacy-pragmatism; Reinventing Privacy Principles for the Big Data Age,
OXFORD INTERNET INST. (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news/?id=1013.
7 This article uses the term “spot collection” to mean the collection of a very
small amount of information, about one limited facet of the person’s conduct, that is
neither stored nor cybernated in any other ways—for instance, the information
collected by those tollbooths that immediately erase data once the computer has
established that the proper toll has been paid.
8 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
10 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
11 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
12 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984).
13 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
14 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
15 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013).
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without causing undue risks to privacy. Some other kinds of
information might be considered private and therefore should not
be collected or used unless a specific authority, following specific
procedures, grants an agent a license to do so. In other cases,
collection of some information should be allowed, but the
government should, from the onset, be limited or banned from
carrying out secondary usages of the information. To express
this notion in terms of the expectation of privacy, an individual
suspected of a crime should expect to be questioned by the police
but should also be able to expect that their answers will be
locked away if they are found innocent.
Several overarching legal doctrines do address the issues
raised by secondary usages and cybernation. This article
addresses two of these. First, the third party doctrine holds that
once a person has knowingly relayed information to a third party,
the sharing of this information with law enforcement officials by
the intermediate party does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search and therefore requires no warrant. The Supreme Court
ruled in United States v. Miller16 and Smith v. Maryland17 that
business records such as financial documents and records of phone
numbers dialed are not protected from warrantless collection by
law enforcement agencies under certain circumstances.18 The Court
also held that law enforcement’s collection of the content of
conversations between suspects and third party informants is not
presumptively unconstitutional, because those third parties could
pass along the information to the police, even without
technological assistance.19 Richard A. Epstein summarizes the
third party doctrine as follows: “The received judicial wisdom is
that any person who chooses to reveal information to a third
person necessarily forfeits whatever protection the Fourth
Amendment provides him.”20
16 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976).
17 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736, 742 (1979).
18 Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 434 (2013). “According to
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, ‘[t]he switching equipment that processed
those numbers [was] merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier
day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.’” Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 570 (2008).
19 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1952). For details, see RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE (June 5, 2014), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43586.pdf.
20 Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the
Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1200 (2009).
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The third party doctrine is particularly problematic in an
age of cybernation. Given that more and more information about
people is in the hands of third parties due to the extensive number
and scope of transactions and communications carried out in
cyberspace and stored in the cloud,21 if the third party doctrine is
allowed to stand, precious little personal information will remain
protected from government incursion. Furthermore, because third
parties can share information with others and combine it with still
more information, the government and corporations can create
detailed and intimate dossiers of innocent people unsuspected of
crimes. Individuals constantly leave behind a trail of data with
every click of a mouse, “data exhaust” akin to the vapors left
behind a car.22 Will Thomas DeVries points out that one of the key
characteristics of the “digital revolution” for privacy is that:
Every transaction with the Internet, every credit card transaction,
every bank withdrawal, every magazine subscription is recorded
digitally and linked to specific individuals . . . . [T]he impact of the
digital age is so deep and pervasive that expansion of a single area of
privacy law is unlikely to adequately address the problems . . . .
Since the digital age affects every aspect of privacy, it requires an
evolution not just in the existing framework, but in the very
conceptual and legal status of privacy.23
Many other scholars have criticized the third party doctrine.24
Another doctrine that speaks to the cybernation
challenge, in effect, takes the opposite tack.25 It assumes that
21 “[T]he Taneja Group estimated the total cloud storage hardware market in
2010 was $3.2 billion, growing 31 percent per year to $9.4 billion by 2014.” Patrick Scully,
Cloud Storage, BROADCAST ENGINEERING (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.highbeam.com/
doc/1G1-341095101.html.
22 Mundie, supra note 6; see also Thomas H. Davenport, Who Owns Your Data
Exhaust?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/11/20/who-
owns-your-data-exhaust/.
23 Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 283, 291-93 (2003).
24 Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981); Susan W. Brenner & Leo
L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored
Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 215 (2006); Susan Freiwald, First Principles
of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007); Lewis R. Katz, In
Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564-66
(1990); Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records
and the Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, UCLA J.L. & TECH.,
Spring 2007, at 1, 3; Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (1983); Andrew J. DeFilippis,
Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1093 (2006).
25 Some refer to this doctrine as the fundamental rights approach; others
refer to it as the information as property approach. Eric Pfanner, Guarding a
‘Fundamental Right’ of Privacy in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2012),
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personal information belongs to the person to whom it applies,
that the individual has a right to keep this information private
that extends beyond primary collection, and that only the person
can agree to secondary usages of the information—even when
they have already consented to primary collection.26 Europeans
often cite this doctrine, which is at the foundation of the
European Data Protection Directive and the European General
Data Protection Regulation;27 for this reason, this article will
refer to it as the European approach.
At first blush, it may seem that the European approach
governs a wholly different area of privacy than the CAPD, which,
to reiterate, deals with the right to privacy vis-à-vis the
government rather than vis-a-vis private actors such as marketers
and data brokers. The European model is nonetheless relevant
because it turns out that, to generalize, governments regularly use
personal information collected by private actors. Thus, the
limitations imposed on private actors affect the scope of
government intrusions. To illustrate: it is difficult to imagine the
conditions, short of an extreme national emergency, under which
the United States government could require all American citizens
to turn over to law enforcement records of their purchases on the
Internet, their emails, and their other transactions. However,
because the same American citizens “disclose” this information to
private corporations, and these corporations aggregate this
information, the government in effect can use the resulting
databases without seeking permission for these secondary usages.28
Many common goods—including public safety, commerce,
and research—could suffer greatly if the European Union were
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/technology/guarding-a-fundamental-right-of-privacy-in-
europe.html?_r=0; see, e.g., Christopher Rees, Tomorrow’s Privacy: Personal Information as
Property, 3 INT’LDATA PRIVACY L. 220 (2013).
26 “The EU’s proposal includes three elements in particular that lend
themselves to a property-based conception: consumers are granted clear entitlements
to their own data; the data, even after it is transferred, carries a burden that ‘runs
with’ it and binds third parties; and consumers are protected through remedies
grounded in ‘property rules.’” Jacob M. Victor, Comment, The EU General Data
Protection Regulation: Toward a Property Regime for Protecting Data Privacy, 123
YALE L.J. 513, 515 (2013).
27
Though the Regulation is framed in the fundamental-human-rights terms typical
of European privacy law, this Comment argues that it can also be conceived of in
property-rights terms. The Regulation takes the unprecedented step of, in effect,
creating a property regime in personal data, under which the property
entitlement belongs to the data subject and is partially alienable.
Id.
28 Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is To Be Done?, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 929, 950 (2012).
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to adhere strictly to its suggested limitations on secondary
usages. It is therefore fortunate that the European laws include a
policy that certain secondary usages of personal information, such
as those for public health or security, do not require consent.29
Thus, the Data Protection Directive provides exemptions in cases
of “(a) national security; (b) defence; (c) public security; (d) the
prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal
offences . . . (e) . . . monetary, budgetary, and taxation matters,”
and a few other cases.30 “[T]he exceptions have to become the
rule,” wrote Joris van Hoboken, “which means that the meaning
of the fundamental right, even if one would want to more
categorically protect certain core interests, is . . . eroded.”31
Moreover, the European approach is riddled with other weaknesses
that make it difficult to implement uniformly.32 In other words, it is
hardly a sound approach.
Moreover, privacy statements provided by businesses and
other agents that rely on the collection of consumer data are
frequently extensive and draw on legal terminology, making them
incomprehensible to most users. Consent means little if those who
consent cannot possibly understand that to which they are
consenting.33 In short, the European approach seems not to
provide a sound foundation for dealing with secondary usages.
29 For example, restrictions on certain kinds of personal data processing
do not apply
where processing of the data is required for the purposes of preventive
medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the
management of health-care services, and where those data are processed by a
health professional subject under national law or rules established by national
competent bodies to the obligation of professional secrecy or by another person
also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy.
Council Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=EN.
Alternately,
Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the
obligations and rights provided for [by the directive] when such a restriction
constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard: (a) national security; (b) defence; (c)
public security; (d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of
criminal offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions; (e) an
important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the European
Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters . . .
Id. at art. 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 42.
30 Id.
31 Letter from Joris vanHoboken to author (Apr. 25, 2014) (on file with author).
32 NEIL ROBINSON ET AL., RAND CORP., REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN DATA
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 26 (2009), available at http://www.hideproject.org/downloads/
references/review_of_eu_dp_directive.pdf.
33 Mundie, supra note 6.
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If the third-party doctrine is truly followed, it leaves little
privacy; if the European approach is truly followed, it
undermines the common good. It seems clear that a different
doctrine dealing with cybernation is needed—one that is neither
as permissive as the third party doctrine nor as strict as the
European approach. This monumental task, for which I can
provide at best a first approximation, is what this article sets out
to chart in the following pages.
Moreover, even initial collection, including limited “spot
collection,” calls for a new doctrine. Since Katz v. United States
(1967), the courts have relied on the expectation of privacy to
determine which types of primary collection are constitutional. For
reasons spelled out in my original paper on this topic,34 the
expectation of privacy is an indefensible basis for such judgments.
Briefly, the expectation of privacy test is tautological: if a judge
rules that a person’s expressed claim to an expectation of privacy
meshes with the judge’s ideas about what a “reasonable” individual
might expect, the expectation of privacy exists. If the judge rules
otherwise, the person should not have “reasonably” expected to
have privacy.35 Thus, whether or not Mr. Katz, a gambler, expected
or did not expect to have privacy when he placed bets in a public
phone booth is immaterial; he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy if a court divined that he had a reason to have it, and he
had no such expectation if a court ruled otherwise.
The societal expectation of privacy is also subjective. The
test presumes that the courts can evaluate such expectations,
yet judges have no way of knowing what a “reasonable” person
would actually expect—and reasonable people differ greatly in
their expectations. Judges do not conduct surveys to discover the
expectations of privacy held by a community. Even if they were
to do so, the results would differ based on the judges’ decisions
about which is the relevant community and would be much
34 Etzioni, supra note 1.
35 Many scholars criticize the circular reasoning of the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” text outlined in Katz. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The
Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188
(1979) (it is “circular to say that there is no invasion of privacy unless the individual
whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will or
will not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is”); see also
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
384 (1974); Richard S. Julie, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth Amendment:
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127,
132 (2000); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 106 (2008);
Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice
Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1013, 1023-24 (2001). The Court
acknowledged this criticism in Kyllo. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
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affected by minor changes to the questions’ wordings. The courts
point to their own shadows as independent grounds for their
rulings. In short, the whole legal edifice based on the expectation
of privacy is fundamentally flawed and should be allowed to fade
and be replaced by a new, better privacy doctrine.
The need for a new privacy doctrine stands out in particular
when one reviews the major court cases that currently provide the
basis for deliberations on privacy by the public, law enforcement
authorities, policy makers, and courts. Each case seems to rely on
a different rationale; some of these rationales are obsolete, and
some are surprisingly idiosyncratic (a harsher critic would call
them capricious). In one the Court found unconstitutional the
planting of a GPS device because it constituted trespassing;36
another found unconstitutional the use by law enforcement of a
thermal imaging device on the grounds that it was not a technology
then in common public use;37 others have referenced the “special
needs” exception;38 yet another held that the presence of a police
narcotics dog at the door of a residence was sufficiently dissimilar
to the act of a private citizen knocking on the door as to be
unconstitutional without a warrant.39 Whatever limitations the
preliminary CAPD outlined below has, it is surely less subjective
than judges’ intuitions as to what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy and is surely more systematic than the
curious amalgam of court cases that currently govern the field.
The liberal communitarian philosophy—which holds that
individual rights, including privacy, have the same fundamental
standing as the common good and that neither a priori trumps the
other—provides an excellent normative foundation for just such a
new doctrine. Each society works out a balance between the two
claims, which is often adjusted to take into account changes to the
society’s international environment, domestic social developments,
and changes in technology. For example, if the United States
suffers several new terrorist attacks, a crime wave of the kind that
swamped American cities in the 1970s, or a pandemic caused by a
new kind of flu, society will likely legitimate moving the point of
balance closer to the common good—and away from the protection
of individual rights such as privacy. If the current state of affairs
continues—that is, there are lower crime rates, no significant
terrorist attacks, and no pandemics—the balance is likely to shift
in the opposite direction. In the wake of the Snowden disclosures,
36 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012).
37 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
38 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2 (1985).
39 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013).
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for example, public figures have called for reversing the shift
towards security that followed 9/11.40
The Fourth Amendment exemplifies the liberal
communitarian approach. It does not categorically state that
there shall be no searches and seizures; instead, it bans only
unreasonable ones. The Fourth Amendment also provides a
mechanism for deciding which of the two claims should be
accorded priority; courts determine whether or not there is
enough evidence that a given person is endangering the public
interest to justify their subjection to legal surveillance. Finally,
the Fourth Amendment implies that surveillance should be as
limited and non-intrusive as possible.41
The following analysis focuses exclusively on one of the
two elements of liberal communitarianism: individual rights, in
particular the right to privacy. It seeks to outline the principles
that should guide the courts and legislatures in determining the
kinds and scope of intrusions by the government that should be
tolerated, banned, or allowed only with prior authorization. The
analysis holds constant the level of contribution to the public good
accomplished by these intrusions and studies only changes in the
level of privacy violation. This “control” is necessary because, as
already indicated, if there was to be a significant change in the
threats facing the common good—whether an increase or a
decrease—the balance between privacy and security (and other
common goods) would have to be recalibrated. I have explored
this subject elsewhere.42
II. OPERATIONALIZATION OF THEKEY PRINCIPLES
Above all, this paper will attempt to show that the CAPD
is more coherent and less subjective than the prevailing doctrines.
40 For example, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT), co-sponsored a bill that would
have limited the NSA’s powers to conduct surveillance. See Ellen Nakashima & Ed
O’Keefe, Senate Fails to Advance Legislation on NSA Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 18,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senate-fails-to-advance-
legislation-on-nsa-reform/2014/11/18/a72eb7fc-6f70-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.html.
41 See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-03 (1983); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-54 (1967).
42 See generally Amitai Etzioni, A Liberal Communitarian Conception of
Privacy, 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 419 (2012).
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A. The Three Dimensions of the Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine
“Cube”
The new doctrine draws on three principal criteria: the
volume, level of sensitivity, and degree of cybernation of
information collected. Together, these dimensions form a cube;
this conceptualization contrasts with the idea of information
collection as a “mosaic.”43
1. Volume
Volume concerns the total amount of information collected
about a person by one agency and amassed in one database. The
measurement refers to one agency and one database because the
law should differentiate between that which one agent may collect
and that which may be collected in total by multiple agents. The
law may greatly limit, for example, the information a health
inspector, an OSHA specialist, or an IRS agent may individually
collect about a given restaurant, but the total amount they and
others are allowed to collect will obviously be much more extensive.
This dimension of the CAPD is relatively easy to
operationalize, and it encompasses two components. The first of
these is quantity, which simply concerns the amount of information
collected, whether this is measured in terms of emails, phone
records, text messages, or, better yet, in terms of megabytes of
information.44 The length of time of a wiretap is in effect a crude
but useable measurement of quantity. It is crude because there is
no strong correlation between the amount of time a tap is in place
and the amount of information collected; parties under surveillance
may vary a great deal in the extent to which they use a tapped
phone. At the same time, the metric is useable because it may not
be practical to allow the authorities to collect a specific number of
calls or bytes of information. There are many precedents for this
approach. For example, at present the courts limit wiretap orders
43 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of
the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 329 (2012).
44 Though, arguably, restrictions or guidelines on the megabytes of
information to be collected should vary based on the type of information. This is
because the byte is, strictly speaking, a measure of data, not information. One hundred
MB of data, for example, is enough for thousands of text emails but less than five
minutes of high quality video, and the former could provide a much greater amount of
private information than the latter.
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to 30 days and grant additional 30-day extensions in accordance
with the Wiretap Act.45
In the case of emails and similar data, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 dictates that upon receiving
a preservation request from law enforcement officials,
telecommunications providers shall:
[T]ake a “snapshot” of available electronic records in the account
which is held pending legal process (such as a search warrant, court
order, or subpoena). [This information is] held for 90 days until legal
process is obtained and submitted to the provider. The 90 day
preservation can be extended once more for an additional 90 days.46
In short, there is ample precedent for using time as a crude
approximation for determining whether a collection of personal
information is acceptable or excessive.
Taking volume into account, rather than merely asking
whether a single collection constitutes a search, finds support in
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in United States v. Jones. This
case concerned the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones’
car after the State’s warrant had expired.47 The GPS tracking
device was activated constantly for 28 days. The majority opinion
did not address the lengthiness of the GPS surveillance, but the
concurring opinion by Justice Alito stated that the length of the
surveillance was a factor in ruling that this tracking constituted a
Fourth Amendment search. Alito writes,
[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses,
society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period. In this case, for four weeks,
law enforcement agents tracked every movement that respondent
made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with
45 Surveillance Self-Defense: Getting a Court Order Authorizing a
Wiretap, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://web.archive.org/web/20140529054606/
https://ssd.eff.org/wire/govt/wiretapping-authorization (last updated May 29, 2014).
46 Kevin V. Ryan & Mark L. Krotoski, Caution Advised: Avoid Undermining
the Legitimate Needs of Law Enforcement to Solve Crimes Involving the Internet in
Amending the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 321
(2012), available at https://www.usfca.edu/uploadedFiles/Destinations/School_of_Law/
Academics/Co-Curricular_Programs/(5)SAN47-2RyanandKrotoski.pdf.
47 “The Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to install a Global-
Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle registered to respondent Jones’s wife.
The warrant authorized installation in the District of Columbia and within 10 days, but
agents installed the device on the 11th day and inMaryland.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.
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precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a
search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.48
The opinion elicited a critical comment by Orin Kerr,
who asked what standard would determine when a mosaic has
been created.49 Kerr writes:
In Jones, the GPS device was installed for twenty-eight days. Justice
Alito stated that this was “surely” long enough to create a mosaic.
But he provided no reason why, and he recognized that “other cases
may present more difficult questions.” If twenty-eight days is too far,
how about fourteen days? Or 3.6 days? Where is the line?50
In response, one notes that there are numerous such cut-off points
in law, such as the number of days suspects may be detained
before they must be charged or released, the ages at which voting
and driving become legal, the number of jurors a jury must
include, and so on. One may say that these cut-off points reflect
the ruling of a “reasonable” person. Actually, they reflect that
which judges or legislators consider a compromise between a
restriction that is clearly excessive and one that is clearly
inadequate—a line that has been adjusted often. There is no
reason the volume of collection that society is prepared to
recognize as “reasonable” should not be similarly governed.
Moreover, the criteria here employed are on the face of it less
subjective and more measurable than what a person or society
expects or what the founding fathers were thinking.
Moreover, for the first approximation purposes here
attempted, it is unnecessary to provide specific numbers to limit
various information collection operations. This is a task for
another article. This article will instead begin by recognizing the
most significant difference regarding volume: the difference
between “spot collections,” the one-time collection of one or very
few discrete pieces of information over a very short period of time,
such as those carried out by speed cameras at intersections, TSA
agents during airport security screenings, and many CCTV
cameras, and prolonged collections, including wiretaps or
continuous GPS tracking.51 Those familiar with these issues may
48 Id. at 964.
49 Kerr,Mosaic, supra note 43, at 329.
50 Id. at 333.
51 To clarify, speed cameras tell only what speed a vehicle is going at a single
moment in time—that is, they collect one discrete data point. The same is true of an
airport screening, which detects information about an individual only at one given
point in time. A single CCTV camera is limited in its ability to collect information; it
cannot collect information about a passing individual except while that person is
within range of the camera. By contrast, wiretaps or continuous GPS monitoring collect
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protest that certain spot collection programs are relatively
comprehensive because they capture all individuals who walk
through an area, for example. However, as will be emphasized
later, a large quantity of information can be collected without
divining meaning from the information through cybernation.
The second concept relevant to the dimension of volume is
informational bandwidth, a term here used to refer to the collection
of different types of information from or about a single subject.
Collection of only one type of information, such as the metadata
associated with an individual’s phone calls, emails, or locations,
constitutes narrow bandwidth collection. By contrast, the
collection of several kinds of information—say, phone call content
and voice data and text message content and email content—
constitutes broad bandwidth collection. Bandwidth is important
because if it is broad it allows law enforcement to gain a much
more comprehensive profile of the person under surveillance than
when it is narrow, and diminishes privacy much more.
One might argue that when high quantities of data are
collected, even on a narrow bandwidth, as is the case with “big
data,” a comprehensive picture of the individual’s private life is
created. However, these concerns do not take into consideration
the limits on cybernation proposed by this article, limits that
would apply particularly strongly to sensitive information. These
limits—including a ban on cybernating non-sensitive information
in order to divine sensitive information—would restrict, legally
speaking, the ability to create such comprehensive pictures when
it would be detrimental to privacy to do so. For the CAPD to be
effective, all three dimensions—volume, sensitivity, and
cybernation—must be applied simultaneously. Considering high
volume collections without simultaneously considering the
sensitivity of the information involved and the level of
cybernation to which it is subjected produces an incomplete
picture of the privacy violations—or lack thereof—caused by a
particular collection. Unbounded “big data” may well blur the
difference between collection and cybernation; however, “big
data” limited by the suggested restrictions would be much less
prone to damaging privacy.
Just as the length of time surveillance is conducted or the
number of messages collected by a search are crude but useable
measures of volume, so is the number of collection methods a
crude but useable measure of bandwidth. This is the case
many data points about the individual over a long range of time and paint a much
more comprehensive picture of the person’s movements or associations.
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because some surveillance methods are able to gather many more
types of information about an individual than others. For instance,
taping phone conversations (which captures the complete content
of a call, potentially including many kinds of information) is a
much broader bandwidth method than the collection of phone
records (which capture who called whom, at what time, and from
where). For traffic control purposes, it is possible to measure the
speed at which a vehicle travels in public places without taking a
picture of the person sitting next to the driver in the front seat
(incidentally, speed cameras are set lower, at the level of license
plates). A more sophisticated measure of bandwidth could take
into account these differences.
2. Sensitivity
The concept that some kinds of information are more
sensitive than others has been often articulated by privacy scholars
and operationalized by lawmakers, albeit using a variety of terms.
Additional terms that have been applied include “intimate
information” or “revealing information,” and some scholars have
defined them in terms of the level of risk to one’s privacy or the
extent of harm to one’s privacy.52 Still others refer to some searches
as “highly intrusive.”53
Two levels of distinction between types of information must
take place in order to enable the development of a nuanced
understanding of sensitive information. The first level of distinction
is very basic; it merely establishes the realm of information to be
considered, distinguishing personal information from other forms
of information that either do not deal with persons or have been de-
identified or anonymized in ways that are presumed to be
irreversible.54 Briefly, all non-personal information is inherently
not sensitive. Revealing the amount of rain that falls in Spain, for
example, endangers no one’s privacy. The issue of sensitivity
concerns the second level of distinction, which distinguishes among
the various kinds of personal information.
52 Reinventing Privacy Principles for the Big Data Age, supra note 6.
53 Daniel T. Pesciotta, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth
Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 187, 237 (2012).
54 This is a subject about which much has been written; it is, therefore, not
further explored here. Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove note, though, that
“numerous federal statutes turn on [the distinction between personally-identifiable
information and other forms of information].” Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove,
The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011).
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Quite a few leading privacy advocates, including ACLU
President Susan Herman,55 rail against the collection of multiple
types of personal information by the government. In response to
the introduction of airport screening gates to prevent
skyjackings, one of ACLU’s staff counsels wrote that “the new
[general] passenger screening regulations are completely
inconsistent with the values safeguarded by the fourth
amendment [sic].”56 The ACLU has also opposed speed cameras
at traffic intersections, calling them “extreme,”57 as well as the
use of cookies on federal government websites58—without which
many Internet activities might well be impossible. (In fact, the
ACLU website itself now uses them.59) Some strong privacy
advocates concede that exceptional conditions exist under which
surveillance and other forms of personal information collection
might be justified, but they hold that the onus is on the
government to prove that such conditions are in place.60 They,
furthermore, set a very high bar that must be cleared before
they consider an intrusion to be justified.
Instead, the CAPD holds—following many others—that
not all personal information can or should be accorded the same
level of protection, and that the more sensitive the information an
agent seeks to collect, the more measures to protect privacy
should be implemented and the higher the public interest must be
before collection of the information is legitimated.
What ought to determine the sensitivity of a piece of
information? Measurements of sensitivity should reflect the
values of the society in question. Some societies, for example,
consider expressions of affection or intimacy, let alone sexual
relations, highly sensitive and private matters, while other
societies take a less constricted approach. For instance, Americans
consider women’s breasts to be highly private, while many
Europeans consider it acceptable to go bare on the beaches. In
55 See generally SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011).
56 Joel M. Gora, The Fourth Amendment at the Airport: Arriving, Departing,
or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1036, 1038 (1973).
57 Jay Stanley, Extreme Traffic Enforcement, ACLU (May 24, 2012, 2:05 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-criminal-law-reform/extreme-traffic-
enforcement; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of Iowa Challenges Use of Speed Cameras in
Davenport (June 14, 2006), available at https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/
aclu-iowa-challenges-use-speed-cameras-davenport.
58 Press Release, ACLU, Government Proposes Massive Shift in Online Privacy
Policy (Aug. 10, 2009), available at https://www.aclu.org/free-speech_technology-and-liberty/
government-proposes-massive-shift-online-privacy-policy.
59 American Civil Liberties Union Privacy Statement, ACLU (Jan. 18, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/american-civil-liberties-union-privacy-statement.
60 See generally HERMAN, supra note 55.
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another example, the cultural norms of some groups hold that
disputes should be resolved in private, while the Mambila people of
Nigeria consider it important to act “within the sight of everyone”
because “[o]nly witches act secretly, eating behind closed doors or
conducting financial transactions at night,”61 . . . and “[q]uarrels
held in public are seen as dangerous since witches may ‘hide’
behind them.”62 This is not to say that any particular society’s
standards of privacy are superior, merely that they are affected by
the particular normative culture of the given society and are a
major factor in determining what the legal system considers
sensitive personal information.
In each society, the legislatures and courts operationalize
these differences in the normative standing of different kinds of
information. In the United States, this ranking has been mainly
brought about by Congress enacting piecemeal a series of specific
laws. For example, the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) treats protected health
information (PHI)63—the identifying information that would
61 David Zeitlyn, The Talk Goes Outside: Argument, Privacy and Power in
Mambila Society Towards a Sociology of Embedded Praxis, 73 AFRICA: J. INT’L AFRICAN
INST. 606, 607 (2003).
62 Id. at 608.
63 PHI is information, held by health care providers, defined as:
1. Name, including current, previous, and mother’s maiden name
2. Postal address and all geographical subdivisions smaller than a
State . . . except for the initial three digits of a zip code . . . .
3. All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual,
including birth date, admission date, discharge date, [and so forth]
4. Telephone numbers
5. Facsimile numbers
6. Electronic mail addresses
7. Social security numbers
8. Medical record numbers
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers
10. Account numbers
11. Certificate/license numbers
12. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers
13. Device identifiers and serial numbers
14. Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
15. Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers
16. Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints
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associate an individual with records of their medical conditions—
as highly sensitive, with restrictions on the disclosure of
psychotherapy notes being especially tight.64 The Department of
Health and Human Services’ description of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule
states that HIPAA “creates, for the first time, a floor of national
protections for the privacy of [consumers’] most sensitive
information—health information.”65
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Miller,66 Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act,
which restricted financial institutions’ ability to share “any
record . . . pertaining to a customer’s relationship with the
financial institution.”67 Several other specific kinds of information
have been deemed sensitive enough to protect through federal
law. Records of video rentals were protected, for example, through
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 following the revelation
of a list of movies rented by the family of Supreme Court nominee
Robert H. Bork.68 Additional types of information entitled to a
higher level of protection include education records (Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act),69 genetic information (the
federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 200870), and
journalistic sources (Privacy Protection Act of 198071), among
others. The FTC has issued guidelines that sensitive data includes
five categories of information, namely financial information, health
information, Social Security numbers, information collected from
children, and geo-location information such as the information
17. Full face photographic images and any comparable images
18. Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code (other than a
unique study ID)
David T. Fetzer & O. Clark West, The HIPAA Privacy Rule and Protected Health
Information: Implications in Research Involving DICOM Image Databases, 15 ACAD.
RADIOLOGY 390, 390-91 fig.1 (2008).
64 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) (2013).
65 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67
Fed. Reg. 53,182, 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/privrulepd.pdf.
66 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
67 12 U.S.C. § 3401(2) (2012); id. §§ 3402-3422.
68 Harold C. Relyea, Legislating Personal Privacy Protection: The Federal
Response, 27 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 36, 43 (2001).
69 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2013); 34 C.F.R. Part 99 (2014), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2014-title34-vol1/pdf/CFR-2014-title34-vol1-part99.pdf.
70 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub.L. 110–233, 122
Stat. 881 (2008).
71 “The Act prohibits law enforcement officials from searching for or seizing
information from people who disseminate information to the public, such as [the
media]. Where it applies, the Act requires law enforcement officials to instead rely on
compliance with a subpoena.” Elizabeth B. Uzelac, Note, Reviving the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2013).
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gleaned from cell phone tracking.72 Legislation has been
advanced—but not yet passed—to grant this status to information
about race and ethnicity, religious and political beliefs, sexual
orientation, and “unique biometric data.”73 In all these cases, the
kinds of information considered sensitive were denoted rather than
defined. That is, lists of examples rather than defining attributes
defined each category. To illustrate with a more concrete example,
listing the names of all qualifying cities would constitute
denotation, whereas stating that any population center with more
than 100,000 people qualifies would constitute definition.
When Congress seeks to classify particular classes of
personal information as more sensitive than others, it often
relies on the rationale that privacy law should prevent
economic or physical harm; that is, sensitive information is
defined as information the unauthorized disclosure of which
could cause tangible harm.74
Sensitivity has also been operationalized through
enumeration of the specific kinds of information that are or are not
sensitive rather than through the articulation of a defining
attribute. HIPAA, for example, defines protected health
information as that which “is maintained or transmitted in any
form . . . and relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental condition of an individual; provision of health care to an
individual, or payment for that health care; and identifies or could
be used to identify the individual.”75 The Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970 likewise regulates the disclosure of “consumer reports,”
which encompass any information “that bears on a consumer’s
credit worthiness or personal characteristics when used to
establish the consumer’s eligibility for credit, insurance, or for a
limited set of other purposes.”76
The courts have also contributed to the categorization of
sensitive information. In United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor
joined the majority opinion and issued her own concurring opinion,
in which she articulated that even short-term GPS monitoring
impinges on privacy rights because it “reflects a wealth of detail
72 Nancy J. King & V.T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the
Cloud? A Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security of Sensitive
Consumer Data, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 424-31 (2013).
73 Id. at 430.
74 Id. at 431.
75 PHI is further elaborated in the law, with 16 specific data fields named as
patient information that must be deleted from health care research manuscripts and
other publications. Elizabeth Madsen et al., HIPAA Possumus, 10 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N 294, 294 (2003).
76 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 54, at 1821.
1282 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4
about [one’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”77 The courts have also limited government’s power
to obtain information on individuals’ book purchasing histories
beginning with United States v. Rumely and famously in the case
of In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc.,
in which the government unsuccessfully attempted to subpoena
Monica Lewinksy’s purchase records.78
Critics have pointed out that because various kinds of
information have been considered sensitive while others have not—
at different points in time and based on different rationales—the
result is a “crazy” patchwork “quilt.”79 There is indeed a need for
Congress to review these myriad laws and more systematically and
consistently categorize the types of personal information that
should be better protected than others. However, for the purpose of
a first approximation, there is little question that sensitivity can be
operationalized, and most sensitive types of personal information
have been extensively categorized.
3. Cybernation
Cybernation is the most novel component of the CAPD.
Sensitivity was a full-blown factor in the paper age; volume was
also an issue in the paper age, although it was one of much less
pressing importance due to practical limitations. However, the
kinds of processing and secondary usages of personal information
engendered by cybernation, as well as their effects on privacy,
were inconceivable in the paper age. Cybernation is also the most
consequential factor of the three dimensions because it is the one
directly tied to the grand shift from focusing on primary collection
to prevent privacy violations to focusing on the privacy violations
caused by secondary uses. Cybernation includes storing, collating
(including building dossiers), analyzing, accessing, and distributing
discrete items of information in concert with each other.
Privacy is much better protected if the information
collected is not stored. If a tollbooth payment system immediately
erases the information that a given car was at the booth at a
certain point in time once the computer has verified payment of
the toll, the risk that the information will be abused to violate
77 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
78 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc., 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1599 (D.D.C. 1998); Andrew
A. Proia, A New Approach to Digital Reader Privacy: State Regulations and Their
Protection of Digital Book Data, 88 IND. L.J. 1593, 1608 (2013).
79 Lawless, supra note 24.
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privacy is very limited compared to a situation in which the same
information is stored. The same is true for speed cameras that
erase the car’s identifying information once it has been
established that the car traveled below the speed limit. By
contrast, all data banks, which keep records about even a single
particular personal item, such as which magazines the person
reads and which bars the person frequents, pose a higher risk to
privacy than non-storing mechanisms. This element of cybernation
can be operationalized, as a first order of approximation, by
determining whether or not the information is stored or instantly
erased. As a second order of approximation, if information is stored,
the degree of cybernation can be approximated by determining the
length of time the information is kept.
With regard to the collation of information about the same
person, especially when building dossiers is involved, the risk to
privacy increases when information collected and stored by one
agent is combined with or linked with information collected and
stored by other agents. For example, some state rights advocates
may prefer state or even regional databases to federal ones.
However, one must take into account that these local databases
are often linked to each other and thus in effect act like one
central database. Although the volume of information in each
state or local database may well be lower than the amount stored
in a national database, that the state and local databases are
linked to each other means that those who have access to them
have access to the same amount of information that would be
gathered in a national database. Many civil rights advocates would
also be greatly concerned if the FBI amassed information on most
Americans, including those who neither have been charged with
any crime nor are under any suspicion—but they pay less mind to
data brokers who keep such information and sell access to the
FBI.80 The law must adapt to these technological developments,
treat all linked databases as if they were one, and impose limits
on collection accordingly.
The risk to privacy is also lower when personal information
is merely stored and collated than it is when the same information
is analyzed to ferret out other information and draw conclusions
80 Etzioni, supra note 28; Martin H. Bosworth, FBI Uses Data Brokers,
“Risk Scores” To Hunt Terrorists, CONSUMER AFF. (July 11, 2007),
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/07/fbi_risk_scores.html; Ted Bridis, FBI:
Data Brokers Probably Act Illegally, WASH. POST (June 22, 2006, 5:50 PM),
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062200932.html
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about the person not revealed by the raw data.81 For first
approximation purposes, this dimension can be operationalized by
considering whether such analysis is carried out at all; that is,
analysis is contrasted with the mere use of raw information.
Additional measurements are needed to establish how much and
what kinds of new information are gained through analyses. In
particular, it is essential that when the collection and use of
sensitive information is banned, so too should analysis that is
used to divine the same information from non-sensitive
information be banned. It seems that no such bans are yet in
place. They are clearly needed because without them, limits on
collecting and cybernating sensitive information face the grave
danger of being eroded.
Finally, risks to privacy are lower when information
collected by one party, such as a hospital or the IRS, is inaccessible
to other parties or is only made available to other parties under
highly special circumstances. The Federal Privacy Act of 1974, for
instance, limits the conditions and the degree to which information
collected, stored, and analyzed by a given federal agent may be
shared with other federal agents or other parties.82 Distribution
and access are two facets of the same process; sharing information
captures both forms of cybernation. Here, the relevant measures
are, first, the scope of limits set by laws and by regulations;
second, the volume of information that is shared; and third, the
number of agents with whom the information is shared. For
instance, social security numbers were initially meant to be used
only by the Social Security Administration and were not meant
to be shared with other federal agents—let alone other parties.83
However, by now they are used very widely. This sharing makes
it easier to collate personal information from different sources
and draw a much more comprehensive, and therefore, privacy-
violating picture of an individual.
To complete the analysis, it is essential to add a variable
that at first blush seems rather different; one might well hold that
it should be treated as a fourth dimension that would turn a cube
composed of volume, sensitivity, and cybernation into a four-
dimensional tesseract. For first approximation purposes, this
additional variable is treated as negative cybernation and is
81 Otherwise known as divining sensitive information from non-sensitive
information.
82 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93–579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552a).
83 Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number, 69 SOC. SEC. BULL.
55, 55 (2009), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/v69n2p55.html.
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referred to as accountability. All the various “places” at which
personal information is collected, stored, and analyzed have at
least some barriers to use by unauthorized parties. These include
simple devices such as passwords and locks on computers as well
as more powerful ones such as firewalls and encryption. Although
all of these have a technological element, human factors are also
involved. Audit trails, for example, are useless if no one reviews
the records detailing who accessed the data and determines if
that information has been inappropriately employed.
All accountability measures limit one element of
cybernation or another. Some limit sharing by preventing most
agents from gaining access to Medicare data; others limit storage
by ensuring that data that has been stored more than a given
number of days or years is erased; others limit analysis, such as
by de-identifying the information. The more extensive and
effective accountability measures are, the less cybernation occurs
and the better privacy is protected. It follows that the stronger the
accountability measures associated with a given database, both in
terms of the number of layers and instruments of accountability
involved and in terms of the quality of each of these—the fewer
privacy violations will occur even if the volume of information is
high, the information’s sensitivity is considerable, and a
significant degree of collation and analysis takes place.
Conversely, if accountability is deficient, more violations of
privacy will occur even if volume is relatively low, information is
relatively non-sensitive, and collation and analysis are not
particularly extensive. This demonstrates once again that
collection is less important in the cyber age than is the scope of—or
limits on—secondary usages, a ratio that is expected to continue to
grow significantly due to improvements in artificial intelligence.84
That the level of accountability can be operationalized can
be gleaned from various debates about whether it is sufficient. For
instance, it has been widely argued that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) is much too lenient because it has
reportedly declined a mere 0.03% of the government’s requests for
court orders authorizing intentional electronic surveillance of
United States persons.85 Defenders of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act that governs such courts argue that the number
84 See generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND
MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT
TECHNOLOGIES (2014).
85 Evan Perez, Secret Court’s Oversight Gets Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 9,
2013, 7:11 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732490400457853
5670310514616?mg=reno64-wsj.
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is so low because FBI agents, fearing damage to their careers if
their requests are rejected, file only well-justified requests, and
because FISC often returns requests for reassessment rather
than rejecting them outright.86 This debate suggests that the data
used to assess FISC’s strictness need to be further fine-tuned
while also showing that accountability can be operationalized.
In June 2013, Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the
National Security Agency, testified to the House Intelligence
Committee that the surveillance programs revealed by Edward
Snowden had contributed to averting “‘potential terrorist events’
more than 50 times since the September 11, 2001 attacks.”87
However, an investigative report by the New America Foundation
found that in the 225 cases of “individuals recruited by al-Qaeda
or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology, and
charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11,”
the NSA’s collection of phone metadata belonging to United States
persons was of minimal help.88 More specifically, the phone
metadata collection program “appears to have played an
identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases,”
while surveillance of non-U.S. persons was helpful to 4.4 percent of
the cases, and “NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority”
was helpful to 1.3 percent.89 At most, therefore, NSA bulk
86
Michael Mukasey, who was attorney general under President George W.
Bush, said in an interview that the lack of rejections by the FISA court
doesn’t mean the court is a rubber stamp. He notes the court sometimes
modifies orders and that the Justice Department’s national-security division
is careful about the applications it presents to the court.
Id.
87 Sean Sullivan, NSA Head: Surveillance Helped Thwart More than 50 Terror
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88 PETER BERGEN ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., DO NSA’S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS? 17 (2014), available at http://www.newamerica.net/
sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Bergen_NAF_NSA%20Surveillance_1_0.pdf.
89 Id. at 1-2. It should be noted that in a full 28% of the cases, the study was
unable to determine what method initiated the investigation because public records and
court records do not reveal this information. The authors assume that an undercover
informant, a family member, etc. tipped off the police, but the possibility of bulk
surveillance playing a role that is not publicly claimed cannot be entirely ruled out.
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Attacks, Group Says, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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“Regular FISA warrants not issued in connection with Section 215 or Section 702,
which are the traditional means for investigating foreign persons, were issued in at
least 48 (21 percent) of the cases we looked at.” BERGEN ET AL., supra note 88, at 2.
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surveillance programs may have substantially contributed to 7.5
percent of these investigations—or 16 cases in 12 years.90
A report released by the Justice Department in 2004 held
that 179 convictions or guilty pleas stemming from 310
investigations of terrorism were materially helped by the Patriot
Act.91 However, a later investigation by The Washington Post
found that despite President Bush’s claims that “federal terrorism
investigations have resulted in charges against more than 400
suspects, and more than half of those charged have been
convicted,” by June 2005, only 39 individuals were actually
convicted of terrorism or other crimes against national security.92
Of the 1755 delayed-notice search warrants authorized by the
Patriot Act from 2006 to 2009, only 15 (or 0.8%) were related to
terrorism investigations.93 More than 1,600 warrants were related
to drug investigations.94
To see the utility of these kinds of data for the
operationalization of accountability, one only has to imagine that
the figures ran the opposite way and demonstrated that the
collections prevented a considerable number of significant
terrorist attacks. That is, if the evidence instead showed that the
various acts by United States authorities that entailed privacy
intrusions served to abort many major terrorist attacks, most
Americans would see them as much more justified. In any case,
the data clearly allow citizens and their elected officials to assess
threat levels, the value of countermeasures, and the effectiveness
of accountability.
B. Combined Considerations
The next step is to combine and apply the three key
considerations. One may argue that such an application of the
CAPD reveals that this is a much more complex doctrine than the
90 Author’s personal calculations based on figures from BERGEN ET AL., supra
note 88, at 4-5.
91 Dan Eggen, U.S. Report Divulges Details of Patriot Act’s Effectiveness, CHI.
TRIB. (July 14, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-07-14/news/0407140330_
1_library-and-bookstore-records-usa-patriot-act-gen-john-ashcroft.
92 Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on
Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST (June 12, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100381.html.
93 Steven C. Bennett et al., Storm Clouds Gathering for Cross-Border Security
and Data Privacy: Cloud Computing Meets the U.S.A. Patriot Act, 13 SEDONA CONF. J.
235, 245 (2012).
94 Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Patriot Act: The Kitchen-sink Approach to
National Security, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 27, 2011), http://nymag.com/news/9-11/10th-
anniversary/patriot-act/.
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expectation of privacy rule. This is indeed a valid observation.
However, given the explosive growth of the role of information in
our private and public lives, its complexity, and the continued
expansion of cybernation, a doctrine of privacy of commensurate
complexity seems unavoidable. Not all possible permutations are
here reviewed, as this article is merely a first attempt to
operationalize the CAPD; however, the main ones are considered
on a first approximation basis. Moreover, while one day it may
well be possible to numerically score each of the elements of the
cube, for the preliminary purposes at hand it will suffice to
evaluate each in terms of “zones,” referring to each variable as
“low” or “high.” In the process it shall be seen that while the
CAPD often leads to rulings and legislation similar to those
currently in place, in some cases it calls for reversing the
prevailing law. Further, in all cases the CAPD provides a
rationale for court rulings and legislation concerning privacy that
is much less subjective and much more systematic than the
rationales now in place. This is an audacious claim; however, it is
one that is surprisingly easy to document, as shall be seen below.
THE CYBER AGE PRIVACY DOCTRINE “CUBE”
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1. Low Volume, Low Sensitivity, No Cybernation: Tollbooths.
2. High Volume, Low Sensitivity, Low Cybernation: Collection of
phone records.
3. Low Volume, Low Sensitivity, High Cybernation: Household
purchases of specific, routine consumer goods.
4. Low Volume, High Sensitivity, Low Cybernation: Airport
screening devices that reveal the body.
5. High Volume, Low Sensitivity, High Cybernation: Select cloud
storage.
6. High Volume, High Sensitivity, Low Cybernation: Health records.
7. Low Volume, High Sensitivity, High Cybernation: Leaks of the
names of CIA agents.
8. High Volume, High Sensitivity, High Cybernation: The sale of
data brokers’ “dossiers” to the government.
Select sub-cubes are next examined, to illustrate that
application of the approach.
1. Low Volume, Low Sensitivity, No Cybernation
The CAPD holds that low volume, low sensitivity, non-
cybernated personal information collection should be tolerated at
the current level of common good because the risks to privacy are
low, and the contributions to the common good engendered by
such collection are very often middling to high. (By “tolerated,” I
mean that the law should allow such collection of information
unless there are specific reasons to object to it; the default should
be an a priori permission to proceed. In colloquial terms, one
might say that “you do not have to love it to allow it.”) Courts
should allow the collection of such personal information, and
Congress should pass laws along the same lines. Examples
include tollbooths,95 license plate readers,96 police body cameras,97
95 See Jay Stanley, Christie Use of Tollbooth Data and Why Location Privacy
Must Be Protected, ACLU (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-
liberty-national-security/christie-use-tollbooth-data-and-why-location-privacy-m.
96 See Michael Martinez, ACLU Raises Privacy Concerns About Police
Technology Tracking Drivers, CNN (July 18, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/07/17/us/aclu-license-plates-readers/.
97 See Martin Austermuhle, D.C. Police to Test Body Cameras, but Civil
Libertarians Raise Concerns, WAMU (Sept. 24, 2014), http://wamu.org/news/14/09/
24/dc_police_officers_to_test_body_cameras.
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airport screening gates,98 breathalyzers,99 general traffic stops,100
random mandatory drug testing,101 health and safety inspections,
and many others. (Components of all these have been contested
by civil libertarians.)
In many of these situations, as a rule, no cybernation
takes place due to informal practices, the technological limitations
of collection mechanisms, or lack of a motive for cybernation—not
necessarily because cybernation is banned unless authorized by a
judge. This at least used to be the case for many operators of
tollbooths and speed cameras, who had no reason to keep the
information, let alone combine it with other information or
analyze it. However, typically the court rulings stemming from
the prevailing privacy doctrine contain nothing to prevent
secondary usages of such information.102 That as a rule no
cybernation takes place is either driven by custom or economic
motives that are easily reversed if data brokers, the press, or even
divorce lawyers seek access to the information. The CAPD points
to the need to explicitly rule that points of collection should be
required to erase information immediately after primary use or
after a given period of time and should be banned from sharing it.
An exception should be included for situations in which public
authorities declare a state of emergency, such as after a terrorist
attack, during the commission of a crime, or after a child has been
kidnapped. Even during such a period of exception, sharing
98 See Susan Stellin, Airport Screening Concerns Civil Liberties Groups, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/business/passenger-screening-
system-based-on-personal-data-raises-privacy-issues.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
99 See Lauren C. Williams, The Next Civil Liberties Fight Could Be over
Breathalyzers, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 12, 2014, 11:43 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
justice/2014/11/12/3590539/breathalyzers/.
100 For example, the ACLU has contended that traffic stops show a pattern of
racial bias. See CPD TRAFFIC STOPS AND RESULTING SEARCHES IN 2013, ACLU OF ILL.,
(2014), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Report-re-CPD-
traffic-stops-in-2013.pdf.
101 See Workplace Drug Testing, ACLU (Mar. 12, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/
racial-justice_womens-rights/workplace-drug-testing.
102 See for example: Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), which
addressed electronic surveillance as a collection mechanism but did not comment on the
government’s right to share that information with others; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967), which found New York’s eavesdropping laws unconstitutional but never called
into question the right of the government to share the information among law
enforcement officials; Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002), which held that the school district’s drug testing policy was
constitutional, but not on the grounds that banning someone from playing a sport for a
positive drug test in effect shares information about that person’s drug use with a variety
of others; and many more. All of the Fourth Amendment cases read by this author
addressed the question whether an unreasonable search or seizure had occurred, and
never asked about the appropriate scope of the government’s subsequent use of legally-
obtained information.
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should be limited to the relevant public authorities. To reiterate,
this is often already the de facto practice; however, for each
category of information collection, it should be made law.
Before turning to the examination of a similar category—
that of high volume, low sensitivity, and low cybernation
collection—that requires distinct treatment, this article shall show
that the CAPD provides a much more systematic rationale for
cases of information collection than does the odd assortment of
prevailing rationales employed by the courts to deal with the very
same cases. The courts provide different rationales for different
cases, which seem highly similar from the CAPD viewpoint
because they all concern low volume, low sensitivity, non-
cybernated information—and should therefore be allowed.
In Schmerber v. California, the court ruled that blood tests
used to evaluate a suspect’s blood-alcohol content are not an
undue imposition on an individual’s privacy per se; although the
collection of a blood sample constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search, there was justification for the police officer to arrest the
defendant and collect a sample, on the grounds that “the test
chosen to measure petitioner’s blood-alcohol level . . . involves
virtually no risk, trauma or pain . . . [and] was performed in a
reasonable manner . . . by a physician in a hospital.”103 In Kyllo,
the Court ruled that because the thermal imaging device used to
survey the temperature in a private home was not yet in general
public use, the use of that device without a warrant under the
circumstances constituted an unreasonable search. In the Court’s
words, “Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”104 This represents
yet another rationale and includes an undefined term—general
public use—as pointed out by Justice Stevens’ dissent, who stated:
[T]he Court’s new rule is at once too broad and too narrow, and it is
not justified by the Court’s explanation for its adoption . . . . [H]ow
much use is general public use is not even hinted at by the Court’s
opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful assumption that the
thermal imager used in this case does not satisfy that criterion.105
In the opinion of this author, a great deal depends on the
nature of the device. If it is able merely to establish the
103 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (emphasis added).
104 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
105 Id. at 46-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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temperature in select rooms of the house and thus determine
whether it is abnormally high—which may indicate the presence
of a marijuana “grow room”—the device’s bandwidth is very
narrow. By contrast, thermal imaging that produces detailed
images of the interior of the house based on temperatures—
showing where individuals are sitting, whether they are in bed,
and so forth—would be considered to have a high bandwidth.
The less invasive form of thermal imaging (the former) should be
allowed; the more invasive one (the latter) should not.106 There is
no inherent reason to cybernate this information for the
purposes of divining additional information about that
individual if nothing incriminating is found.
Still another rationale was used by the Supreme Court in
their ruling in Florida v. Riley,107 which examined the question
whether aerial surveillance from a helicopter constituted a
violation of Riley’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that,
because Riley had no reason to believe that his criminal activity
was not visible from the air by a private citizen operating an
aerial vehicle from a height of 400 feet, Riley had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in this situation.108 The height of 400 feet
was selected because this was the height at which the police
helicopter in the case flew over Riley’s property; the Court ruled
that it was entirely possible that “any member of the public” could
have flown at that height over the property. It is at least implied
that if a higher flying plane would have been used, Riley might
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Moreover, in the cyber age, one can violate privacy just
as much or more in public spaces (e.g., by using parabolic
microphones to eavesdrop on conversations in a public park) as
one can do in the home (e.g., by using a thermal device or
narcotics sniffing dogs to measure temperatures or detect the
presence of controlled substances in a private residence).
Although many sensors are being added daily to the home—
such as smart thermostats, computers, security cameras, and
smart televisions—the tapping of these sensors by the
government becomes excessively intrusive on privacy only
when the information collected either is inherently sensitive or
is considered jointly, or cybernated. It is only from examining
all of these streams of information that the government can
106 Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2506312.
107 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
108 Id. at 451-52.
2015] A CYBER AGE PRIVACY DOCTRINE 1293
piece together a comprehensive picture of the activities of the
individuals contained within. For this reason, the CAPD should
be applied as if privacy were a bubble that surrounds a person
and that is carried with her wherever she goes.109 This idea is
consistent with Justice Stewart’s oft-cited assertion from
United States v. Katz that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”110
Moreover, the bubble should be extended to the digital
person—that is to dossiers or profiles kept by the government.
This deserves some elaboration. An individual in a remote ranch
in Montana may be free from most physical surveillance by
speed cameras, CCTVs, and other technologies. However, his
communications and internet transactions could still be used to
form an invasive profile of him. The CAPD therefore holds that the
personal bubble, including personal information amassed by the
government, should only be legally penetrated if law enforcement
follows given procedures and is authorized by specified authorities,
in line with the very communitarian Fourth Amendment—or if
only low volumes of narrow-bandwidth information, low in
sensitivity, are collected and subjected to low or no cybernation. In
other words, the CAPD should extend the right to privacy to the
virtual person.111 The right to privacy should encompass both
parts of the person: the virtual and the offline. (Calling the offline
“real” disregards the increasing importance of the virtual part of
life for more and more people.)
In Jones, the Court drew on two considerations. First,
attaching the GPS to a car, considered a private space, amounted
to trespassing.112 CAPD would not accept this consideration for
reasons previously indicated. Second, the Court opened the door to
the CAPD by suggesting that the surveillance undertaken in Jones
was too long.113 However, given the very narrow bandwidth of
information collected and its relatively low sensitivity, the CAPD
would allow the surveillance at issue in Jones if cybernation was
properly limited.
109 For additional discussion of this concept, see Etzioni, supra note 1.
110 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
111 Technically, the term “virtual sub-person” would be more appropriate
because the virtual parts of personhood are still part of the person. The agent that acts in
cyberspace has one or more names of his or her own, a distinct locality and address,
manners, and postures that are on the one hand distinct from those of the offline person
but are also linked. Moreover, if the virtual person commits a crime, the whole person is
judged and punished. If the virtual agent is exposed, the offline person is as well.
112 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
113 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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In Katz v. United States, the Court used a still different
rationale—by finding that Katz had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a public telephone booth. By contrast, the CAPD would
hold that the police should be allowed to install surveillance
equipment on telephone booths on the grounds that the amount of
information collected is low, the bandwidth of the information
collected is limited (and could be further curtailed by using the
same minimization techniques used in wiretaps and other
methods of intelligence collection), and the information collected
is not of a sensitive nature. The CAPD would be more concerned
if, even if Katz was found innocent, law enforcement were to keep
and share a record that he was a suspect. The CAPD would
therefore allow this kind of warrantless tapping only if proper
accountability measures were in place to ensure this information
is not shared inappropriately.
In Florida v. Jardines, the Court ruled that the use of a
narcotics-sniffing dog to detect illegal drugs in a suspect’s home
was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
because the dog was brought into the curtilage of the home—
albeit only onto the porch.114 The Court found that unlike a law
enforcement official knocking on the door, the act of introducing
a police dog into the area was different from the typical,
expected actions of a private citizen and was therefore a search.
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:
We have accordingly recognized that “the knocker on the front door
is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying
ingress by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.” This
implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by
the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then
(absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms
of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal
knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation’s
Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed
with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because
that is “no more than any private citizen might do.”
But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area around the
home in the hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is
something else. There is no customary invitation to do that.115
A court following the CAPD would arrive at the opposite
conclusion, given that the information collected was of low volume
and very narrow bandwidth. Concern with cybernation would be
114 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013).
115 Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the same as with Katz. Once again it must be emphasized that
the CAPD views the home as no more inherently private than the
public sphere—or, more precisely, the CAPD seeks to protect
information, not places. The premise of the CAPD is that sensitive
information derives its status not from where it is revealed, but
from the content contained in the revelation. A great many things
that occur in the home may be sensitive, but this is not due to
their occurrence in the home. Measuring the level of air pollution
in a home would entail much less of a privacy violation than
reading a person’s emails, even if they were sent from a bench in
a public park. Of course, the opposite may also take place; much
more highly sensitive information could be collected from the
home than from speed cameras. The key variables are the
volume, the level of sensitivity, and the extent of cybernation—
not where the information was first collected. Thus, while the
Fourth Amendment refers to “persons, houses, papers, and
effects”116—in the various cases cited above, and many others, it
deals with private space, mainly the home and other spaces that
like the home, have walls, such as containers and bags. The
CAPD, which focuses strictly on the person, places greater
emphasis on protecting what the Fourth Amendment lists.
United States v. White concerns the use of a government
informant wearing a hidden microphone to record conversations.117
The Court ruled that this act does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search, because the suspect has no reasonable
expectation that the undercover informant will not pass along the
information she receives to law enforcement.118 A court following
the principles of the CAPD would come to the same conclusion as
long as the authorities set limits on the length or number of
conversations recorded, no other modes of surveillance are used
simultaneously, and cybernation of the resulting information is
properly limited through accountability measures.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
118
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966),
which was left undisturbed by Katz, held that however strongly a defendant
may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a
government agent regularly communicating with the authorities. In these
circumstances, “no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment
is involved,” for that amendment affords no protection to “a wrongdoer’s
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it.”
Id. at 749 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The CAPD would also recognize a broad category of
administrative and safety “searches” that collect a low amount of
narrow bandwidth information but furnish critical contributions
to a public good. Health inspections at restaurants fit into this
category; the information collected by the health inspector is of
low volume, with very few searches happening per year and
specific types of information sought. The information collected is
also of low sensitivity—indeed, most of it is not personal. Finally,
there is little need to cybernate the information as long as the
restaurant is in compliance with food safety laws; in the case of
non-compliance, the information would only be cybernated with
other health inspection information from the same restaurant to
track progress. If kept for the purposes of public policy analysis,
the information’s identifying markers would be removed. This
rationale seems more coherent, more systematic, and less
subjective than the myriad diverse reasons given by the courts for
authorizing administrative searches. Indeed, many legal scholars
have bemoaned the complexity of administrative search
jurisprudence in particular, calling it “incoherent,” “abysmal,”
“devoid of content,” a “conceptual and doctrinal embarrassment,”
and “chaotic at best.”119
It is therefore clear that the criteria employed by the
CAPD can be as readily operationalized as the criteria now
used by the courts. It is similarly clear that the CAPD provides
a much more systematic and less subjective set of criteria for
distinguishing those intrusions that do not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment.
2. High Volume, Low Sensitivity, Limited Cybernation
The collection of information about a person over longer
periods of time and at a high bandwidth should be tolerated as
long as the information is of limited sensitivity and cybernation is
limited, in particular by strong accountability measures, because
violations of privacy will be limited in these cases. This category
includes the planting of beepers, tracking the location of cell
phones, the long-term use of GPS tracking devices, and similar
law enforcement projects. Again, it is useful to consider the
similarities and differences between courts instructed by the
119 Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 254, 257 (2011); Russell L. Weaver, Administrative Searches, Technology and
Personal Privacy, 22 WM. &MARY L. REV. 571, 571 (2013).
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prevailing privacy doctrine and a court whose rationale stems
from the CAPD.
Consider, for example, the case of Smith v. Maryland. In
this case, the police, without a warrant, installed a pen register
that recorded all of the numbers that connected to the phone of a
robbery victim who had begun receiving calls from his
attacker.120 The Court ultimately ruled in this case that the
suspect’s expectation of privacy had not been violated on the
grounds that the numbers he dialed had been passively received
by the phone company, a third party.121 In this case, a court
applying the CAPD would reach the same ruling—albeit with a
different rationale for doing so. Such a court would find that the
information collected was of low sensitivity because it does not
include the content of the calls.
Persistent Surveillance Systems sells to police
departments in the United States a technology that can combine
and analyze multiple public safety data streams instantaneously.
It uses helicopters or small planes whose cameras scan large
parts of a city continuously and feed the images into a command
center.122 The planes also carry infrared cameras that can track
people and cars under foliage and in some buildings.123 The
information is kept and analyzed in the command center
maintained by the company. The Washington Post reports that
“[the company that sells the system] has rules on how long data
can be kept, when images can be accessed and by whom. Police are
supposed to begin looking at the pictures only after a crime has
been reported. Fishing expeditions are prohibited.”124 The amount
120 “[T]he telephone company, at police request, installed a pen register at its
central offices to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at petitioner’s home.”
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). . . . “The activity here took the form of
installing and using a pen register. Since the pen register was installed on telephone
company property at the telephone company’s central offices, petitioner obviously
cannot claim that his ‘property’ was invaded or that police intruded into a
‘constitutionally protected area.’” Id. at 741.
121
[P]etitioner’s argument that its installation and use constituted a “search”
necessarily rests upon a claim that he had a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone. This claim must be
rejected. First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.
Id. at 742.
122 Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an
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of information this technology collects, its bandwidth, and its
cybernation are significantly higher than those of tollbooths, speed
cameras, and other similar technologies included in the previous
category. The information’s sensitivity is, generally, relatively low.
The main privacy effects of this technology concern the scope and
kind of cybernation involved. If the company’s self-imposed rules
are codified in the law—and the law is effectively enforced—the
privacy implications of this and other such technologies would be
limited and tolerable. If these conditions are not met, the use of
such technologies should be prohibited because their use amounts
to subjecting all people all the time to fishing expeditions. The
main variable that differentiates that which can be tolerated from
that which should be banned is not collection but rather the level
of cybernation. (To reiterate, this article focuses on the harms to
privacy of various government acts rather than on their
contributions to the common good. Both elements must be
considered, per liberal communitarianism, but this article holds
constant the contributions to the common good accomplished by a
particular use of surveillance.)
An even more telling case is that of Microsoft’s Domain
Awareness System (DAS), a technology that “aggregates and
analyzes existing public safety data streams” from cameras,
license plate readers, radiation detectors, and law enforcement
databases.125 The technology helps police keep an eye on suspects
by providing their arrest records, related 911 calls, and local
crime data, as well as by tracking their vehicle’s location.126 DAS
also makes it possible to tap into and rewind more than 3,000
CCTV camera feeds.127 DAS may also be expanded in the future to
gain access to many additional CCTV cameras as well as to
encompass facial recognition, cell phone tracking technologies, and
even social media scanners.128 The data assembled is cybernated in
order to identify particularly suspicious individuals, their contacts,
and their modi operandi. Data are to be deleted within five years,
but material deemed to have “continuing law enforcement or public
125 Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Kelly and Microsoft
Unveil New, State-of-the-Art Law Enforcement Technology that Aggregates and Analyzes
Existing Public Safety Data in Real Time to Provide a Comprehensive View of Potential






128 Martin Kaste, In ‘Domain Awareness,’ Detractors See Another NSA, NPR
(Feb. 21, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/02/21/
280749781/in-domain-awareness-detractors-see-another-nsa.
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safety value or legal necessity” may be retained indefinitely.129 The
New York Police Department has some accountability measures in
place to limit access, with the “type of data each officer can view”
being “tailored to their job duties,”130 but it also shares “data and
video with third parties not limited to law enforcement.”131
Oakland, CA, has already operationalized the first phase of a
similar system,132 and Baltimore, MD, and the United Kingdom
already use similar technologies.133
The CAPD here alludes to the same conclusions drawn
from the case of Persistent Surveillance Systems (PSS). The main
difference between PSS’ technology and DAS is that the amount
and bandwidth of information collected by DAS is much higher.
The question whether or not accountability measures sufficiently
limit cybernation, by guaranteeing no fishing expeditions occur
and information is not unduly shared or abused, is the critical
variable to consider.
The NSA’s collection of phone call metadata raises
numerous complex issues that cannot be explored in passing in
this article.134 However, the ways the CAPD would approach the
program are illustrative. First of all, much discussion by those
who follow the prevailing privacy doctrines has focused on the
question of collection and on suggestions that the government
should cease to collect this information and instead should rely on
phone companies to keep it. The CAPD would focus much more
attention on the usages of the information. If it is true: that the
NSA collects only metadata and refrains from collecting the
content of calls; that it collects a large volume of information of
very narrow bandwidth and relatively low sensitivity, akin to
addresses on envelopes; that the NSA has to gain approval of a
FISC judge in order to examine the records associated with any
particular individual; and that FISC is indeed strict in granting
such permissions only when there is a compelling case; then
129 PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE, PUBLIC SECURITY PRIVACY GUIDELINES 4 (2009),
available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/NYPD-DomainAwarenessSystem.pdf.
130 Pervaiz Shallwani, ‘Future’ of NYPD: Keeping Tab(let)s on Crime Data,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2014, 11: 52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405
2702304815004579419482346315614.
131 Neal Ungerleider, NYPD, Microsoft Launch All-Seeing “Domain Awareness
System” with Real-Time CCTV, License Plate Monitoring, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 8, 2012,
12:07 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3000272/nypd-microsoft-launch-all-seeing-domain-
awareness-system-real-time-cctv-license-plate-monito.
132 Nadia Kayyali, EFF Fights Back Against Oakland’s Disturbing Domain
Awareness Center, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2014/03/eff-fights-back-against-oaklands-disturbing-domain-awareness-center.
133 Ungerleider, supra note 131.
134 For more on this subject, see Amitai Etzioni, NSA: National Security vs.
Individual Rights, 30 INTELLIGENCE&NAT’L SEC. 100 (2015).
1300 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4
cybernation is well-limited and the program seems to pass
muster. If one or more of these suppositions are not valid, it
becomes much more difficult to justify the program given the
United States’ current security needs. To reiterate, the goal here
is not to evaluate the program but rather to call attention to the
key variable that should be employed in judging it—the extent of
cybernation, which includes an assessment of the level of
accountability that is in place.
3. High Volume, Low Sensitivity, High Cybernation
The courts, in accordance with their focus on primary
collection rather than on secondary usages, have allowed
surprisingly high quantities of wide bandwidth, highly sensitive,
highly cybernated personal information to be collected by law
enforcement. Once again, the discussion that follows assumes a
constant level of threat to the public good and holds constant the
benefits of surveillance programs.
The increasing use of drones by public authorities (privacy
violations by private actors are beyond the subject of this
article135) raises still more complex issues. On the one hand,
drones are mainly engaged in primary collection. From this
viewpoint, if one draws on Justice Alito’s concern in Jones, the use
of drones would constitute a search in Fourth Amendment terms
because they collect large quantities of information. The CAPD
would add that drones provide information that is of a much
broader bandwidth than the information provided by a GPS. At
the same time, drones are often used for purposes such as finding
lost children or skiers or delivering help to stranded victims of
earthquakes and floods—all acts for which one might hold that
there is presumed consent by those involved. What about their
deployment for routine police surveillance? This issue is now
being sorted out by regulatory agencies and the courts.
In one case, in which they ruled wiretaps constitutional,
the court neglected to comment on the use of drones.136 The case
concerned a group of far-right extremists known as the Montana
Freemen that issued in 1995 a “citizens declaration of war”137
against the United States government, occupied a 960-acre
135 See generally Etzioni, supra note 28; see also JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET
NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS
SURVEILLANCE (2014).
136 See United States v. McGuire, 307 F. 3d. 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002).
137 Ann LoLordo, ‘Freemen’ Wage War Against Authority in Montana,
BALTIMORE SUN (July 31, 1995), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-07-31/news/
1995212003_1_freemen-skurdal-musselshell-county/2.
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ranch in Montana following foreclosure, and initiated an armed
standoff with law enforcement.138 The resulting case, United
States v. McGuire,139 held in part that federal agents had not
violated the Freemen’s right to freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Freemen claimed that the
government’s use of judicially-approved “phone and fax
wiretapping on Freemen properties, and . . . a microphone on the
premises to record conversations” were in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because they allegedly exceeded the limits of
authorized government action outlined by the relevant portions
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.140
However, the Supreme Court held that:
FBI agents could not have conducted on-site surveillance of the Freemen
property because of its remote, rural location and group members’ alertness
to law enforcement activities, which created grave dangers. Agents also
would have faced risks in executing any search warrant at the compound,
because of the group’s known violent propensity and undisputed
possession of assault weapons. Federal agents would have had difficulty
infiltrating the group with FBI informants . . . [and] interviewing
witnesses would have helped little.141
Because direct surveillance posed a danger to the agents working
on the case, and there were no alternative reasonable options
available to the agents, the Court ruled a number of search
techniques constitutional under the circumstances, namely
electronic surveillance. (The agents also used aerial surveillance to
monitor the ranch, and the issue was not raised in court.142) (The
Court also held that the FBI had met the Act’s requirement to
use reasonable minimization procedures when conducting
wiretaps, that it had indeed taken reasonable steps to “eliminate
irrelevant information,” and that any delays in sealing the
information in accordance with federal law had a reasonable
explanation.143 For these reasons, the Court denied the claim
that the FBI had acted improperly.) The CAPD would reach the
same conclusion, but a court following the CAPD would hold
that given the high amount and considerable bandwidth of the
138 Leonard Zeskind, Montana Freemen Trial May Mark End of an Era, 90 S.
POVERTY L. CENTER INTELLIGENCE REP. 9 (1998), available at http://www.splcenter.org/
get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/1998/spring/justice-vs-justus.
139 McGuire, 307 F. 3d. at 1195.
140 Id. at 1195-96.
141 Id. at 1197 (emphasis added).
142 Tom Kenworthy, Freemen Surrender Ends 81-Day Siege, All 16 Give
Themselves Up Peacefully to FBI, SPOKESMAN-REV. (June 14, 1996), http://m.spokesman.com/
stories/1996/jun/14/freemen-surrender-ends-81-day-siege-all-16-give/.
143 McGuire, 307 F.3d at 1202.
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information collected, even of low sensitivity, drones should be
allowed only if cybernation is limited.
4. High Volume, High Sensitivity, Must Limit
Cybernation
According to the CAPD, highly sensitive information
should be collected only if there is a compelling public interest in
doing so. Here, too, the main issue is limiting cybernation rather
than collection. The Social Security Administration, Medicare,
Medicaid, and the IRS all hold considerable amounts of sensitive
personal information on the United States’ 300 million (mostly)
innocent citizens. That their databases have been very rarely
abused and the harm caused by violations has been limited,
however, shows that a considerable level of collection and
cybernation of sensitive information can be tolerated when
accountability is very high.144
The same cannot be said about the databases kept by the
FBI,145 or state and local government agencies146 and accessed by
144 See, e.g., G.W. Schulz, Bureaucrats Can’t Resist Celebrity Snooping in
Government Databases, THE CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://cironline.org/blog/post/bureaucrats-cant-resist-celebrity-snooping-government-
databases-821; Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005–Present, PRIVACY
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach; Michael
Cooney, How to Get the IRS’ Attention: Forge Nearly $8 Million in Tax Returns, Steal
Identities, NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 10, 2012, 11:16 AM) http://www.networkworld.com/
article/2186572/malware-cybercrime/how-to-get-the-irs--attention--forge-nearly--8-million-
in-tax-returns--steal-iden.html; IRS Employee Charged with Illegally Accessing Celebrity
Tax Records, ACCT. WEB (June 4, 2008), http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/tax/irs-
employee-charged-illegally-accessing-celebrity-tax-records; Levi Pulkkinen, IRS Worker
Caught Snooping on Ex, Others, SEATTLE PI (Apr. 23, 2012, 9:44 PM),
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/IRS-worker-caught-snooping-on-ex-others-34985
50.php; Andrea Coombes, IRS Employee Sentenced for Snooping, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 20,
2008, 7:40 PM) http://www.marketwatch.com/story/irs-worker-snooped-on-tax-records-of-
almost-200-celebrities; Stephen Barr, IRS Still Has Tax Snoops: Workers Fired, Disciplined
for Peeking at Friends’, Celebrities’ Records, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 9, 1997, 12:00 AM),
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19970409&slug=2533005; Mark
Ballard, List of Councils Whose Staff Illegally Accessed DWP Data, COMPUTER WEEKLY
(July 21, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280090284/List-of-
councils-whose-staff-illegally-accessed-DWP-data; Jim Geraghty, The ‘Very Serious’
Tradition of the Internal Revenue Service, NAT’L REV. (June 13, 2013, 4:00 AM)
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/350906/very-serious-tradition-internal-revenue-
service-jim-geraghty’.
145 Tom Hays, NYC Cases Show Crooked Cops’ Abuse of FBI Database, YAHOO
FINANCE (July 7, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/nyc-cases-show-
crooked-cops-abuse-fbi-database-162152158.html.
146 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Private Investigator and Former
NYPD Officer Arrested in Bribery Scheme to Obtain Reports from Federal Law
Enforcement Databases, (Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-
releases/2014/private-investigator-and-former-nypd-officer-arrested-in-bribery-scheme-
to-obtain-reports-from-federal-law-enforcement-database; Amy Pavuk, Law-Enforcer
Misuse of Driver Database Soars, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 22, 2013),
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the Department of Homeland Security.147 These all have been
abused, as revealed by the Church and Pike Committees and
various leaks to the media. Some consequently argue that these
collections should be greatly curtailed, if not abolished entirely.
Civil libertarians have often objected to the details (or even the
very existence) of such databases, including the Terrorist Screening
Database—which includes the “No Fly List”148—and the federal
DNA profile database, NDIS.149 Although the rationales for these
objections differ, they often reflect—aside from specific concerns,
such as the belief that DNA profiles are particularly sensitive
information—a sense that the government cannot be trusted.
Even if the current government is trustworthy, many civil
libertarians say, future governments will abuse the databases,
and it is therefore best if no collection or storage occurs.
Discussion of the CAPD has so far focused on one of the
two core elements of a liberal communitarian approach—rights,
in particular the right to privacy—and has held constant the
other element: the common good. This is necessary because a
society that faces higher demands for the common good in the face
of an epidemic or some other threat may well permit greater
intrusions on individual liberties than a society that faces lower
or declining demands for the common good. However, it must be
noted in closing that the analysis is incomplete without
accounting for the contributions to the common good called for in
a given society at a particular moment in history. To stay with the
present example, given that many crimes in the United States
remain unsolved and that DNA databases help to close a growing
number of such cases, DNA databases should be maintained or
expanded with the caveat that accountability measures should be
improved. Numerous suggestions to this effect have been made
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-01-22/news/os-law-enforcement-access-databases-
20130119_1_law-enforcement-officers-law-enforcers-misuse.
147 “As part of the [Pretrial Diversion] agreement, Camaj admitted to having
conducted 314 queries [of the Treasury Enforcement Communication System] while
knowing that those queries were unauthorized.” Camaj v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
2013-3060, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 2013), available at https://cases.justia.com/
federal/appellate-courts/cafc/13-3060/13-3060-2013-10-16.pdf.
148 See ACLU, U.S. GOVERNMENT WATCHLISTING: UNFAIR PROCESS AND
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES (2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/assets/watchlist_briefing_paper_v3.pdf. The ACLU’s writings on and advocacy
against the “No Fly List” are available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/tag/no-fly-list.
149 See, e.g., TANIA SIMONCELLI& SHELDON KRIMSKY, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L.
& POL’Y, A NEW ERA OF DNA COLLECTIONS: ATWHAT COST TO CIVIL LIBERTIES? (2007),
available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Simoncelli__Krimsky_-_DNA_
Collection__Civil_Liberties.pdf.
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and need not be explored here.150 (That accountability can be
effectively operationalized has already been demonstrated.)
Some have expressed fear that a future government might
remove such protective measures and abuse the information held
in databases. The greatest threats to democracy, however, have
historically arisen not from abuses of databases but from fearful
populations that sought stronger authorities because the existing
ones did not adequately protect them from violent crime, civil
war, and external enemies. Russians suffering from a breakdown
of law and order welcomed Putin. In Russia between 1989 and
1993 the total crime rate increased by 73%, or 1,180,000
reports.151 The homicide and attempted homicide rate rose from
9.2 per 100,000 inhabitants to 19.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in the
same timeframe.152 Indicative of how shredded the social fabric had
become, in 63% of major criminal injuries the victims were
relatives or friends of the offenders. Russia’s suicide rate increased
60% from 1989 to 2000.153 There were also sharp increases in
highway accidents, weapons and currency smuggling, and
robberies. In Egypt, the citizens restored a military regime. Post-
Mubarak, violent interpersonal attacks increased, as did inter-
group violence, and a complete breakdown of civil order occurred as
the police in more than one-third of Egyptian provinces walked off
the job in 2013.154 Many Iraqis increasingly yearn for stronger,
more authoritarian leadership. New Yorkers and Angelenos,
suffering from high rates of violent crime in the 1980s, supported
police departments that made short order of individual rights, as
well as the commissioners and mayors that adopted such
initiatives. In the mid-1990s, the public cited crime as the biggest
problem facing the country (19%), with an additional 2%
identifying guns as the biggest problem.155 In 1996, 54% of
American adults said drug and alcohol abuse were getting worse,
and 53% said the same of “robberies, shootings, and other kinds of
150 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Give the Spies a Civilian Review Board,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 11:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amitai-
etzioni/give-the-spies-a-civilian_b_14793.html.
151 Ilya V. Nikiforov, Russia, in WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS (1993), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/wfbcjsru.pdf.
152 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPE IN A TIME OF CHANGE: CRIME POLICY AND
CRIMINAL LAW 97(1999).
153 Facts & Stats of the Yeltsin Era, PBSFRONTLINE, available at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/yeltsin/etc/facts.html (last visitedMar. 8, 2015).
154 Patrick Kingsley, Egyptian Police Go on Strike, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2013,
3:41 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/10/egypt-police-strike.
155 Richard L. Berke, Crime Is Becoming Nation’s Top Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/23/us/crime-is-becoming-nation-s-top-fear.html.
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violent crime.”156 After 9/11, a majority of Americans favored
adopting more limited interpretations of the Constitution in order
to protect the nation from further attacks.157
All this suggests that a doctrine concerned with protecting
privacy should allow for sufficient security—and other public
goods, such as public health in the face of a pandemic—and
should permit the collection and cybernation of the data necessary
to do so, so long as the usages of this data are properly supervised
and curbed. Prohibiting all collection is not the answer. Concerns
about government abuse are best addressed not by ceasing
collection and storage, but by building up the foundations of civil
society, public education, and voluntary associations, and by
ensuring that public goods are provided.
C. Key Considerations
It is necessary to outline a few major considerations
that underlie the endeavor. First, during a discussion of the
original paper, several colleagues asked whether the suggested
doctrine is a proposed means of interpreting the Constitution
or a framework for passing legislation and formulating public
policy. After all, as these legal scholars pointed out, a world of
difference exists between the former, which deals with the
courts, existing case law, and the ways in which judges
deliberate; and the latter, which involves the democratic
processes of the legislature.158
While there are indeed significant differences between
these two institutions, the CAPD is an articulation of normative
principles that apply to and affect both. That changes to
normative precepts affect both institutions is highlighted by
developments in other arenas. In the wake of changes to the
United States’ moral culture precipitated by the Civil Rights
Movement, the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson in
the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education, and Congress
passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Recent changes to the
moral culture, in which libertarian principles led some to take
similar positions to those held by liberals regarding same-gender
marriage, have led to court cases, most notably United States v.
156 HINDELANG CRIM. JUST. RES. CTR., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS-1995 130 tbl. 2.5 (1996).
157 AMITAI ETZIONI, HOW PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT?: FREEDOM VERSUS
SECURITY IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 5 (2004).
158 Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long LiveKatz, 102MICH. L.REV. 904, 913 (2004).
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Windsor,159 in which the Court ruled that interpreting the words
“marriage” and “spouse” to apply only to heterosexual couples
violates the Due Process Clause. There have similarly been gains
for same-gender-marriage in state legislatures. Furthermore, the
same moral shift has led to changes to federal administrative
rules regarding the extension of the tax and other benefits of
marriage to same-gender couples. A similar sea change must now
take place with respect to the normative conceptualizations of
privacy and its application by the courts and legislatures. Several
preliminary steps in this transformation are outlined below.
Second, this article has assumed the current state of the
common good in the United States will continue—that is, there
will be declining or relatively low rates of violent crime, no new
major terrorist attacks on the United States homeland, no
pandemics, and no other significant new challenges to the
common good. Otherwise, for reasons already mentioned, the
equilibrium between the common good and privacy may have to
be established at a different point than indicated below.
Third, an important thesis underlying this article is that
as a privacy doctrine is adapted to the grand transformation of
information from the paper age to the cyber age, society can
become more tolerant of spot collection of personal information if
at the same time it becomes more restrictive of secondary
usages—that is, if it restricts cybernation of the information
collected—without suffering a net increase in privacy violations.
This is true of all circumstances except for limited conditions,
such as the arrival of a tyrant. There is an inverse relationship
between the two elements: the less cybernation, the more primary
collection is possible without causing an increase in privacy
violations. The more cybernation is allowed, the less collection can
be tolerated if the demands of the common good do not call for a
net increase in intrusions.160
Fourth, the challenge my colleagues posed when asking
me to specify the new doctrine is completely justified, indeed
essential, if the courts and legislatures are to apply this doctrine.
However, the law often functions without taking definitions to the
third decimal point and by leaving much interpretation to the
discretion of law enforcement authorities, lower courts, and
regulators. For example, in cases of drunk driving, the moment a
suspect has actually been taken into custody and must be read
159 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714 (2013).
160 For a concept of harm, see Reinventing Privacy Principles for the Big Data
Age, supra note 6.
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her Miranda rights seems to remain unclear.161 The Bill of Rights
defines the right of a United States citizen to be tried by an
“impartial” jury rather than merely a judge in criminal cases;
however, the definition of “impartial” is far from specified.162
These examples illustrate that the courts function more or less
effectively without excessive precision. In short, specification is
essential, but the law functions quite well without carrying it to
the level demanded by the sciences. This is particularly the case
given that, to reiterate, only a first approximation of the new
doctrine is here attempted.
CONCLUSION
The prevailing privacy doctrines (of which this article has
discussed two) reflect concepts suitable to the paper age, in which
the main issue was whether primary collection of information
unduly intruded on individuals’ privacy. Such intrusions required
court authorization in line with the Fourth Amendment. This
article argues that since the advent of the cyber age many more
risks to privacy emanate from the secondary usages of personal
information—regardless of how it is collected. No prevailing
privacy doctrine of which I am aware addresses this pressing
issue.163 Moreover, the notions of a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” and affording special status to the home are obsolescent.
The CAPD would take into account the risks to privacy
posed by the collection of high volumes of information of high
sensitivity, paying particular attention to the extent to which the
information is cybernated—processed, analyzed, and shared. The
CAPD would also consider the degree to which various
accountability mechanisms impose limitations on cybernation.
This analysis has focused exclusively on one of the two core
elements of a liberal communitarian philosophy—namely, the
effects on the right to privacy, holding constant the contributions to
the common good. Several illustrations have been provided to
161 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). Although the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to a case of drunk driving that sought to clarify this distinction, the
Court ruled that until the suspect is actually placed under arrest and into a police
vehicle the question of whether she is in custody is a function of the extent to which the
circumstances of the stop mimic the restraints and stresses of actual arrest. Id.
162 In common law, “impartial” was understood to mean having a lack of familial
ties to or financial interest in the outcome of a case; however, today people often interpret
“impartial” to mean that jurors know nothing of the case at hand other than the facts
presented at trial. Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGSL. J. 1579, 1619 (2011).
163 The “equilibrium-adjustment theory” proposed by Orin Kerr does, however,
provide an interesting perspective. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of
the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 478 (2011).
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demonstrate that such an analysis can be operationalized and that
the CAPD provides a much less subjective and more systematic
rationale for the courts and legislatures to consider when creating
law than the rationale presently available. Such a doctrine would
form part of a long-overdue refinement to the concept of privacy,
allowing it to stay relevant in the cyber age.
How should the judicial and legislative branches
proceed? Part of what must be done is the job of Congress. In
particular, the legislature ought to examine the myriad and
diverse laws that define some kinds of personal information as
more sensitive than others. It should determine if the rankings
pursuant to the CAPD need to be updated, and it should identify
and rank types of information that remain undefined; for
instance, are records of a person’s reading habits sensitive
information that should be entitled to special protections? The
rest is up to the courts. Here, a lawyer might point to Alito’s
concurrence in Jones as a starting point.
The most difficult challenge facing the courts and
Congress concerns cybernation, first because the courts focused
for so long on primary collection and not on secondary usages,
and second because of the possibility of “split decisions” that
would allow the collection of certain kind of information (e.g.,
phone records) but limit secondary usages of that information.
The courts will have to do what it did with decisional privacy
and read between the lines of the Constitution to divine a basis
for the much-needed CAPD.
